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Roscoe Pound first presented his lecture The Causes of Dissatisfaction with the
Administration of Justice in 1906.1 It was the heyday of the Progressive Era, a
government reform movement that coupled concern for social justice with efforts to
improve government efficiency. Progressives opposed waste, corruption, and ward
politics and sought to change both the quality and scope of government services.
Reformers addressed what they viewed as an anemic government response to
substantial social problems and widespread corruption.
Fast forward to today: Justice Shepherd asks us to address The Causes of
Dissatisfaction Roscoe Pound Never Thought About. In framing this discussion, one
needs to consider how judges can affect satisfaction with democratic government and
how that satisfaction, in turn, affects them. For courts to satisfy the citizenry, ensure the
efficacy of their institutions, and maintain democratic accountability, they need to
adapt to significant changes occurring in the delivery of public goods and the exercise
of public authority.
As "government" changes to "governance" and the barriers between the sectors
become more permeable, judges face state action from multiple actors and citizens find
themselves affected by official authority dispensed by private individuals. Government
is changing by necessity, finding it impossible to resolve complex horizontal problems
through narrow, vertical, hierarchical, command-and-control bureaucracies. Public
officials find their roles transformed from direct service providers to managers who
generate public value through third parties.
This trend will continue, driven by the simple fact that the public's appetite for
government solutions exceeds the resources available. And, the problem will be
exacerbated as the service demands generated by an aging population put further strain
on already limited funding. This imbalance between demands and resources can be
illustrated by comparing the number of workers to retirees over time. Today, for each
retiree, there are roughly four workers, whereas in 1930 there were forty-two. By 2050
there will be only two workers for every one retiree. 2 And, those retirees will consume
huge amounts of public resources. For example, expenditures on nursing home care,
which in 1990 amounted to roughly $10 billion, will reach $40 billion by 2014.3
In addition to ever-increasing demands for government services, citizens today do
not tolerate mediocre-quality, "one-size-fits-all" services delivered through traditional
government offices during limited regular work hours. As large corporations
personalize their services to global audiences, government excuses for bad
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performance become unacceptable. If "'mass customization' lets Dell offer its
customers 16 million possible computer configurations 'A that can be delivered just
days after placing an on-line order, why can't government personalize its services?
Experts like New York University Professor Paul C. Light already see the effect of
these pressures on the size and shape of government. Light's work shows that civil
service employment fell by approximately 418,000 jobs between 1990 and 2002;
during that same period, contract-generated jobs increased by 110,000 and grant-
generated jobs by more than 440,000. 5 These figures show that government by proxy is
increasing; that is, government is producing more and more services through third
parties. On this phenomenon, Martha Minow of Harvard Law School writes:
At the turn of the twenty-first century, the increasing use of private organizations
to achieve public ends reflects a number of trends: disillusionment with
government programs, faith in competition and consumer choice, politicians'
desire to claim to have diminished government when in fact they have merely
outsourced it, and strategic pressure for privatization by lobbying groups. 6
In our most recent book, Governing by Network, Bill Eggers and I call this evolving
form of government-one in which services are provided through networks
intentionally created by public actors to produce public services-networked
government.7 Let me give you an example. In 1993, the National Park Service received
a prime piece of real estate located just steps away from the Golden Gate Bridge.8 But
turning the environmentally challenged land into a first-class park required millions of
dollars that Congress had not allocated. An entrepreneurial park manager recruited the
partners and funds necessary to put together a wonderful park, and today, only eighteen
percent of the employees in that park work for the government. 9 To what standard
should the other park workers-volunteer, not-for-profit, and for-profit groups-be
held? And, as long as park patrons receive fair and respectful services, should it really
matter for whom the employee works? As my esteemed colleague Mark Moore writes,
"[T]he innovation that is fostered by allowing or encouraging different ways of
delivering public services may, over time, increase effectiveness by encouraging the
exploration of new, more robust methods."'
0
The shape of government is changing-from hierarchical, vertical silos to networks
of public, private, and not-for-profit providers-but little attention has been paid to
managing and protecting democratic values in the new system. Today, I would like to
suggest that the answer to Pound's question depends on how courts protect public
4. William Eggers, Made to Order, GOV'T TECH., Jan. 26,2005, available at http://www.
govtech.com/gt/articles/92875 (emphasis in original).
5. PAUL C. LIGHT, BROOKINGS INST., FACT SHEET ON THE TRUE SIZE OF GOvERNMENT 5
(2003), http://www.brookings.edu/gs/cps/light20030905.pdf.
6. Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accountingfor the New Religion, 116
HARv. L. REv. 1229, 1240 (2003).
7. STEPHEN GOLDSMITH & WILLIAM D. EGGERS, GOVERNING By NETWORK: THE NEW
SHAPE OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR (2004).
8. Id. at 3-4.
9. Id.
10. Mark H. Moore, Introduction, 116 HARv. L. REv. 1212, 1224 (2003).
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values when private parties produce public goods. As Laura Dickinson, in the Yale
Journal of International Law, summarizes:
While advocates of privatization have generally argued for the practice on
efficiency grounds, critics have worried that, even if privatization may cut
financial costs, it can threaten important public law values. Because many
constitutional norms protect individuals only from government misconduct, and
because courts have been largely unwilling to view such norms as applicable to
private contractors, these critics have argued that privatization will dramatically
reduce the scope of public law protections in the United States. "
However, by understanding the transformed delivery mechanism and crafting new
tools and standards in response to these changes, courts can protect public values, thus
encouraging public respect for democratic government and the judiciary. As Eva
Sorensen of Roskilde University, Denmark, states, the move to governance-which
disperses the capacity to govem among many actors--offers potential opportunities for
enhancing democracy:
[T]he increased space for self-governance increases the number of available
channels of influence for each citizen .... increases the chances that each citizen
obtains influence on the decisions that affect him or her the most, ... increases the
space for plural ways of life in society,... contributes to the development of the
participatory skills of citizens .... [and] strengthen[s] the social and political
sense of communality .... 12
Yet, ensuring accountability without destroying the very flexibility and discretion
that prompted the creation of this new delivery system presents difficult challenges.
Courts will have to balance flexibility with accountability in assuring the public's
satisfaction. As Minow goes on to say, "If competition can be harnessed through public
accountability requirements, however, innovations and plural forms of social provision
will strengthen the nation's total response to people in need."'1
3
In this context, the current standards and analytical tools utilized may not only be
obsolete but could lead to short-term dissatisfaction with the courts, and government in
general. Pound could not envision this situation because the dissatisfaction, in part,
originates with the very rules Progressives advocated when he made his 1906 speech.
I present this overview not as a constitutional law scholar but from my work on
public management, specifically, my examination of how government services are-
more and more-delivered through a network of providers. It follows, then, that when
judges evaluate the adequacy of administrative procedures and adjudicate due process
and equal protection claims, which form the fundamental basis of democracy, the
distinction between state action and private action may no longer be so straightforward.
In this form of governance, an elected official spends more time leveraging his
assets-in order to gain flexibility, discretion, and reach-than he does managing his
11. Laura A. Dickinson, Public Law Values in a Privatized World, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 383,
384 (2006).
12. Eva Sorensen, Metagovernance: The Changing Role of Politicians in Processes of
Democratic Governance, 36 AMER. REv. PUB. ADMiN. 98, 104 (2006).
13. Minow, supra note 6, at 1230.
2007) 1245
INDIANA LA WJOURNAL
employees. These assets are money, authority, and rhetoric, and they are deployed in
order to induce private providers to produce public value. For example, when a chief
justice focuses on a particular theme in his or her "State of the Judiciary Address," the
rhetoric furnishes a convening and focusing power for that community. As government
uses private players to extend its reach, each of the branches must consider how to
maintain the controls inherent in a democracy. On this topic, Freeman says:
In other words, privatization can be a means of "publicization," through which
private actors increasingly commit themselves to traditionally public goals as the
price of access to lucrative opportunities to deliver goods and services that might
otherwise be provided directly by the state. So, rather than compromising the
democratic norms of accountability, due process, equality, and rationality-as
some critics of privatization fear it will-privatization might extend these norms to
private actors .... 14
Conversely, the failure of progressive bureaucracies to keep up with complex
societal problems also presents serious issues for courts attempting to remedy
structural deficiencies in executive branch activities. When courts are forced to place
systems-such as child welfare-under their ongoing supervision, they are attempting
to mitigate the inequities inherent in the existing delivery system with additional
oversight and dollars. If the delivery system itself is the problem, though, then
conventional oversight and dollars are not the answer. A new delivery mechanism-a
network-is required. Further, the old distinction about whether a service is "inherently
governmental" also does not make much sense. For example, even war, most certainly
an inherently governmental function, includes participation from a mixture of sectors.
To illustrate this point, I suggest comparing troop deployments. In the first Gulf War,
the United States deployed one contractor for every fifty soldiers. By the Iraqi
Freedom campaign, the U.S. force included one contractor for every ten soldiers.1
5
Though these issues may not have been anticipated by Pound, he accurately
captured the conditions that created these circumstances when he noted in his lecture:
A closely related cause of dissatisfaction with the administration of justice
according to law is to be found in the inevitable difference in rate of progress
between law and public opinion. In order to preclude corruption, to exclude the
personal prejudices of magistrates, and to minimize individual incompetency, law
formulates the moral sentiments of the community in rules to which the judgments
of tribunals must conform. These rules, being formulations of public opinion,
cannot exist until public opinion has become fixed and settled .... 6
Pound's prediction of dissatisfaction applies in the current environment where the
public's demand for better services drives changes in governance at a rate that exceeds
the ability of the courts to define and apply the rules necessary to protect democratic
14. Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARv. L. REv
1285, 1285 (2003).
15. Nelson D. Schwartz, The Pentagon's Private Army, FORTUNE, Mar. 17, 2003, at 100
(citing figures from P. W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORs: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED
MILrrARY INDUsTRY (2003)).
16. Pound, supra note 1, at 399.
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values. The situation is aggravated by executive branch failures because public
employees often do not possess the skills necessary to configure and manage these
networks. How can the courts establish a new set of guidelines upon which to protect
democratic accountability without eliminating the very benefits the network can
provide?
I. THE PRACTICAL MEANING OF STATE ACTION
Consistent with my perspective as a mayor and not a constitutional scholar-and
confirming that all politics are local-let me use trash collection to talk about "state
action" in a networked government model. When we privatized half of the trash routes
in the City of Indianapolis (multiple vendors operating competitively bid franchises
within districts), we notified citizens that they should hold the mayor responsible if the
trash was not picked up and contact the city call center to complain regardless of
whether a city employee was assigned to that route. The city did not "off-load" its
responsibility to pick up the trash. Nor did it shed its duty to make sure that trash in
poorer communities was picked up with the same frequency and quality as in areas that
were more affluent.
In terms of guaranteeing fairness and due process, the triggering event for public
accountability and review should be whether government uses its assets to initiate the
solution that delivers the service, not whether the worker providing the service is
contractual. For example, Indiana recently secured proposals from organizations-
private and not-for-profit-interested in taking over the front-end of its welfare benefit
eligibility process.17 Previously, state employees provided eligibility determinations in
a manner that guaranteed equal protection, although it was equally inadequate
protection.'8 Overworked government employees with insufficient technological
resources required two million unnecessary trips a year-primarily from working,
poor, single parents-to state welfare offices to provide information and answer
questions for which the data was readily available elsewhere.' 9 Tens of millions of
dollars that might have been spent helping struggling Hoosiers were spent on these
determinations. The contractors taking over this function will affect the benefits of tens
of thousands of Hoosiers and, though surely increasing the overall quality of the
services, still must be held responsible for the important values of democratic
accountability: fairness, equity, and access.
In this model, state action involves using public assets to cause private actors to
accomplish public goals, and its success, ultimately, rests on controlling public values.
My colleague Mark Moore shares one problematic view of the possibilities:
In this view, what is important in the distinction between public and private is not
who produces the results, not even who finances the results, but instead what
agent becomes the arbiter of the value of any good (whether publicly or privately
financed or produced). Privatization shifts the arbiter of value from a political
17. ERIN LINVILLE, INDIANA FAMILY & Soc. SERVS. ADMIN., ELIGIBILITY MODERNIZATION:
THE NEED FOR CHANGE (2006), available at http://www.in.gov/fssa/transformations/edp/edp/
index.htmi.
18. See id.
19. CYNDI CORNELIUS, HOOSIER COALITION FOR SELF-SUSTAINABILITY, RESPONSE TO STATE
OF INDIANA'S REQUEST FOR INFORMATION 6-C: EXECUTVE SUMMARY 4 (2006).
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process focused on defining collective ambitions and aspirations to an individual
deciding whether something is good in his or her own (more or less selfish,
hedonistic, and materialistic) terms. In short, we might see privatization most
importantly as the individualization ofjudgments about value that formerly were
made collectively.
20
Yet, this risk can be mitigated by careful executive and judicial action that defines
procedures to ensure that private actors discharge collective decisions when their
conduct involves substantial public assets. Responding to this transformation, the
courts should move from controlling public processes and toward preserving public
value. In the networked government approach, the threshold question that guides
government action-and should orient court review-is "what public value does the
executive branch official intend to add?"
A. Protecting Democratic Values While Producing Public Value
To answer Pound's question, we need to define how government institutions can
adapt to and manage the transformation to third party government, such that the
executive branch concentrates on outcomes and the judicial branch protects democratic
values. In developing these guidelines, both branches need to clearly address a
different meaning of "value": public value. Managing public value-not programs-is
the standard by which government should be judged. To illustrate this distinction, I use
an example from Mayor Anthony Williams in Washington, D.C. When Mayor
Williams reviewed his city's public hospital, which like similar institutions in other
cities operated as a healthcare provider of last resort, he found significant financial
problems.2 1 In trying to rectify the situation, the Mayor considered privatization.
Before making any decisions, though, he asked: What is the value I'm supposed to be
producing for my citizens? 22 The answer was "public health," not "a public hospital."
Answering the question in this manner allowed the Mayor to focus on how to produce
the public value of health as contrasted to the activity of a hospital. As a result, he
created a community health network, which decentralized health care delivery and
closed the hospital.2 3
Thus far, I have focused on the transformation of government services and argued
that it should be the use of a government asset, and not the nature of the employer, that
triggers court protection of democratic values. I am not arguing that such a distinction
brings with it all the rules and review standards applied to direct state action.
Therefore, the issue I want to focus on going forward is what procedures the executive
branch should consider and what guidelines might the courts apply in order to protect
democratic values? Providing protections without destroying the very reasons for
networked government will be a continuing and difficult challenge.
20. Moore, supra note 10, at 1215 (emphasis in original).





B. Rule Making: Contract Provisions and Regulations
Clearly, rules provide the most direct route to protecting citizens, yet the existence
of substantial, discretion-narrowing rules is the very phenomenon driving the inability
of public officials to creatively solve public problems. Government's core competency
is applying a narrow set of rules fairly and uniformly. What happens, though, when
discretion becomes the necessary premium?
Let's look at two examples: welfare reform and incarceration. When Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC) was the primary welfare benefit program, the
administrative challenges were minimal: applicants lined up in front of government
employees who would determine eligibility. If the applicant qualified, he or she
received benefits. Evaluations of the process were based on mathematical error rates-
for example, how many eligibility determinations were incorrect?
When the federal government converted AFDC to Temporary Aid for Needy
Families (TANF),24 a work-based system, the situation changed dramatically. Under
TANF, benefits are conditioned on work. Now, providing the applicant help presents
more significant challenges: how can the applicant secure a job without child care,
adequate education, a safe environment, child support, transportation, protection from
discrimination, and more? In fact, government provides a program for each problem.
But, to succeed-in this case, to assist a person to secure work-requires a network of
community, faith-based, and government providers. Government can not deliver all
these services itself. It is now government's responsibility to activate that network.
Federal legislation created the benefits associated with TANF, and state and local
contracts implement its provisions through a combination of contractual money;
authority, which conditions benefits on certain activities; and strong rhetoric, which
celebrates the benefits of work. The presence of these public assets must trigger rules
and provisions protecting fairness, equity, and access and safeguarding against
discrimination.
The penal system offers another example of a mixed service system. On one side of
the street, a sheriff may run a jail; on the other side of the same street, a private
company may also run ajail. Prisoners are assigned to either facility. In both situations,
obviously, the use of the state's authority caused the offender to be imprisoned and that
offender is entitled to humane conditions.
Officials can more easily craft rules to protect prisoner rights than those of welfare
applicants. Offenders deserve the same treatment, and the services provided can be
relatively easily evaluated. Further, the sheriff can impose quality standards in the
bidding and contract provisions. To the prisoner, the judge, or the sheriff, the rights
provided should not depend on the color of the shirt worn by the guard or benefit
worker.
Regulations promulgated in advance or imposed through a contractual vehicle do
not so neatly fit the TANF situation. The need for individualized solutions produced
the need for the network in the first place. Obviously, forcing government officials to
treat everyone in an identical fashion would undermine the results. In addition,
24. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.




measuring social service outcomes, in which the network plays a particularly important
role, is enormously difficult. The public value, as illustrated in the D.C. hospital
example, would not be simple "benefit eligibility" but, rather, whether the person in
need of help successfully achieved his or her goals-be it drug treatment, ajob, further
education, or a combination of all three. Even in a straightforward situation like the
jail, protections are often insufficient. Contracts do not contain suitable output
measures and poorly trained monitors scrutinize inputs rather than outcomes and rights.
Generally, government lawyers can competently write a request for proposal and
negotiate standard contract provisions that rely on detailed accounting and reporting
procedures, but these provisions do not allow for the flexible inputs required to
accomplish the carefully negotiated outcomes.
Contract terms should include attention to these "public values." One example of
incorporating values through rule making is Australia's Public Service Act, which
requires that the Australian Public Service "incorporate and uphold" fifteen separate
Public Service Values ("APS Values") and a formal Code of Conduct ("Code").25 The
extent to which the APS Values and Code are applied to private contractors varies by
government agency:
[S]ome agencies stipulate complete adherence to the APS values .... More
commonly, however, agencies single out certain relevant aspects of the APS
Values and Code with which agencies must comply. Which aspects are considered
most relevant can be summarized in terms of particular distinctive public service
values... namely two outcome-related values (responsiveness to government and
fair and impartial treatment of the public) and two process-related values (public
accountability and merit appointment).26
Strict rules and input-driven contractual regulations might accomplish superficial
fairness but at a huge cost in terms of effectiveness. And, of course, neither judges nor
mayors aspire to achieve a standardized mediocre or failing response. Officials must
recognize that accountability and flexibility often compete with each other. The use of
taxpayer resources triggers certain accountability requirements, but vigilance at the
cost of effectiveness is counterproductive.
Putting aside whether one agrees with her policy objectives, Dickinson,
nevertheless, provides a helpful summary of contracting practices that would preserve
public values when she suggests the following:
(1) [I]ncorporating public law standards in contractual terms; (2) requiring that
private contractors receive training; (3) enhancing contractual monitoring, both by
internal government actors and third parties; (4) requiring that contractors receive
accreditation from independent organizations; (5) laying out clear performance
benchmarks; (6) mandating contractor self-evaluation; (7) enhancing governmental
termination provisions and allowing for partial governmental takeover of
contracts; (8) allowing for beneficiary participation in contract design; and (9)
25. Richard Mulgan, Outsourcing and Public Service Values: The Australian Experience,
71 INT'L REV. ADMIN. Sci. 55, 56 (2005), available at http://ras.sagepub.concgi/reprint/
71/1/55.
26. Id. at 62.
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strengthening enforcement mechanisms, including greater whistleblower
protections and more opportunities for third-party beneficiary suits.
27
I am Chairman of a federal agency called the Corporation for National and
Community Service (CNCS), the parent of AmeriCorps, Learn and Serve America, and
Senior Corps. CNCS invests government dollars in thousands of partners that produce
highly flexible, localized responses. Every year, predictably, some very small
percentage of our partners does something inappropriate, which generates official
response and leads to a tightening of the accountability rules to reduce the chances of
abuse. The result of placing new requirements on all partners-instead of targeting the
response to the organizations in the wrong-is that the honest performers are punished.
They must either divert program dollars to compliance or lose some of the very
discretion that made their partnerships so valuable in the first place.
In evaluating the fairness and legality of a service network, each branch of
government needs to consider whether other criteria or procedures--over and above
simple rule making and contract provision promulgation--ensure democratic
accountability. Broader participation, which fosters greater effectiveness, creates
complicated challenges for the government in ensuring the provision of administrative
rights and constitutional protections. For example, how can client choice in the
network help protect the interests of a pluralistic society?
C Accommodating Pluralism Through Choice
When government uses its money or its authority, it needs to be sensitive to
diversity. Obviously, a mayor should not make participation in a faith-based shelter a
condition of receiving care, but nor should he or she prohibit the provider as a choice
merely because of its faith perspective. Sorensen's work shows that in a revised model
of representative democracy, "[t]here must be made a considerable space for plurality
for individuals and groups with regard to way of life.",28 The extent to which the
network accommodates choices and variations should be a factor in determining
whether government activated the delivery system in an appropriate way. As Minow
writes:
[I]ntroducing private options supported by public resources can advance
pluralism. Pluralism means valuing the variety of ethnic, religious and cultural
groups within society and the virtues of tolerance and mutual accommodation.
Pluralism calls upon the government and private actors alike to respect distinctive
groups. In the United States, the Constitution has long been understood to ensure
parents a variety of educational options so that parents may guide their children to
take on "additional obligations" alongside those chosen by the state. Pluralism in
social services may foster meaningful connections within communities formed
around neighborhood, religious, or ethnic identities.29
The adequacy of the choices depends on the nature of the organizations in the
network, and one of the more difficult challenges for government involves determining
27. Dickinson, supra note 11, at 402.
28. Sorensen, supra note 12, at 103.
29. Minow, supra note 6, at 1244.
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which organizations should be allowed to provide services. If an organization
proposing to provide services has principles viewed as strongly antagonistic to certain
populations, should it be allowed to participate? Government cannot discriminate on
the basis of religion, for example, in choosing network participants. But, perhaps it
can, and should, establish a process that excludes organizations espousing views
inconsistent with the goals of the issuing government agency. For example, in 1995 the
Anti-Defamation League called upon the United States Department of Housing and
Urban Development to terminate its contract with the Nation of Islam's security firm,
not because the firm provided inferior services, but because Minister Farrakhan had
made disparaging comments about Jews.30 One can imagine a wide range of
hypotheticals about which organizations should be allowed to participate, but
addressing this question in a manner that accommodates a fair amount of choice
without exposing the network to hostile partners is no easy feat.
In configuring network providers and enforcing accountability, executive officials
and courts should consider the extent and type of choice citizens may exercise. As
Moore notes:
[T]he populations that governments seek to serve are often heterogeneous: one
size may not fit all, and the overall effectiveness of government efforts might be
increased if government programs were targeted differently to different market
niches .... The improvement to heterogeneous clients from recognizing and
responding would be partially offset by concerns that clients were being treated
differently (therefore, potentially unfairly) in government programs. But if
efficiency and effectiveness in achieving mandated goals were the primary
objective, and if concerns about justice and fairness in the differential treatment
were assessed, it would be desirable overall for government to create conditions
that would allow it to respond to client heterogeneity. 31
Executives need to consider these diversity issues in determining which organizations
are allowed to participate in providing public services, and the extent of network
diversification should be an important criterion to the courts. Additionally,
government's inability to produce heterogeneous responses, such as in child welfare,
might very well be the reason for some of its failures.
D. Enforcing Rights Without Governmentalizing the Private Sector: Hold
Government Agents Responsible and Force Accountability Downward
Writers like Gilmore and Jensen advocate forcing a vast array of public
requirements-such as complying with public record requests and divulging profit,
salaries, or work processes-on private participants delivering government services.
32
These efforts run the risk of compelling private organizations to become more like
government, thus marginalizing their value and minimizing their creativity. Clearly,
private providers most assuredly need to be responsive to important norms; protection
30. E.g., Editorial, No Contracts for Haters, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 21, 1995, at 10A.
31. Moore, supra note 10, at 1224.
32. Robert S. Gilmore & Laura S. Jensen, Reinventing Government Accountability: Public
Functions, Privatization, and the Meaning of "State Action, " 58 PuB. ADMIN. REv. 247 (1998).
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of these norms can be insured by obligating providers to meet certain requirements and
holding government accountable when it fails to delegate its authority correctly.
Incorporating normative standards provides a starting point for networked
government; technology provides the tools necessary to it. A combination of internet,
intranet, service synchronization and collaboration software, shared databases, and
common data interchanges make it possible to supervise outsourced partners in
previously unimagined ways. Not only can events be monitored in real time, but
sophisticated algorithms can determine the number of exceptions that are occurring and
in which situations. Intrusive and restrictive input requirements are no longer required
to hold governmental agents responsible for protecting public values and securing
agreed-upon outcomes. In fact, the irony is that many of these tools exist more
completely in the private sector, allowing the private sector to respond more fairly than
traditional government, which routinely lacks sophisticated technological applications.
E. Require Transparency, Competition, and Public Participation
When evaluating the fairness of an outsourced activity, courts can reasonably take
into account the transparency and public participation associated with the process. In a
network of providers, decisions may be left to "self-governing" actors with the
resulting danger "that those who already possess a high degree of participatory skills,
such as members of large firms, organizations, or associations and well educated,
experienced subelites, will be able to utilize the new channels of influence more
efficiently then the less empowered." 33 But, an open and competitive process assures
that the standards and requirements upon which the network is built have been fully
disclosed. A competitive process will more likely protect important democratic values
"by enhancing publicity; by promoting plurality; by calling for the inclusion of all
affected citizens; by promoting forms of participation that increase the political
resources, competencies and efficacies of the less capable among the affected.,
34
II. WHEN COURTS ACTIVATE THE NETWORK
The issues presented affect chief justices in three ways. First, as defenders of
democratic accountability, chief justices will need to anticipate new conditions
associated with networked government in order to sustain public confidence. In
addition, because chief justices often function as network activators-for example,
when they operate probation and public defender programs-they will need to
establish rules for nongovernmental actors utilizing government authority. When a
judge places an offender in a "community assignment" in lieu of imprisonment, the
court should establish rules and working relations consistent with the elements of a
network operation. Additionally, the relationship among the participating entities will
require careful supervision.
As an example, consider the case of the award-winning partnership between the
New York State Parole Department and La Bodega de la Familia. The Parole
Department engaged La Bodega in order to increase the chances of successful prisoner
33. Sorensen, supra note 12, at 104.
34. Id. at 105.
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re-entry by involving families and employers in the support and sanctioning process.35
This creative solution appeared perfect, but the two organizations needed to overcome
their cultural differences in order for the partnership to work. The parole officers
viewed enforcing the technical requirements of parole, including handcuffing prisoners
for curfew violations, as paramount to their jobs.36 La Bodega officials, however,
proclaimed that keeping parolees removed from difficult circumstances (and out of
jail) was more important than imposing technical requirements. 37 In these situations, a
shared understanding of the goals of the partnership is vital. These relationships and
understandings become even more critical when a network partner deploys the loaned
power of the state.
Public dollars and official authority granted to a community group can produce
substantial results, but courts must consider the standard for services provided,
conditions for success, and, in some cases, the philosophical approach of the network
partner. As referenced by Minow, "Government agencies act not only as purchasers of
goods and services but also as guarantors of freedom and equality. 38
Finally, the need for network solutions raises complicated questions for courts: in
this new environment, what does it mean for a court to appoint a master or enforce an
order against a system? Judges cannot on their own transform either a welfare system
or a school system, for example, but they need not necessarily be satisfied with an
administrative response that spends more money inside a structurally flawed delivery
system. Perhaps, they can help to ensure that a broader array of solutions is considered.
Whether a judge is configuring his or her own resources or attempting to enhance the
quality of services in a matter under review, true innovation rests upon officials who
can envision solutions provided in this new way.
CONCLUSION
Governing by network brings with it new opportunities and new risks. With vision
and significant attention to management, elected officials can produce considerably
more public value-and in a more personalized fashion. However, the interlocking
delegations of authority inherent to networked government often mix private and
public agendas. Government officials will need new talents, tools, and approaches to
insure democratic accountability and protect important values. Courts, in turn, will
need to adapt more quickly to the changes occurring in the executive branch in order to
avoid one of the causes of the dissatisfaction described by Pound.
Governing by network presents important questions for courts as they sort through
the nuances of protecting democratic accountability:
* Does the asset deployed to create the network-rhetoric, money, or
authority-affect the standards applied?
" Does the character of the public finance, whether it is a tax credit, voucher, or
contractual payment, make a difference?
35. See GOLDSMITH & EGGERS, supra note 7, at 67.
36. Id. at 114-15.
37. Id.
38. Minow, supra note 6, at 1246.
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* If the agent dispenses state action, can sufficient guarantees of due process be
achieved by holding the government principal accountable or must the
private actor allow new levels of intrusion?
* Does the role of the court increase when the quality measures in the network
are more difficult to define?
* What should courts do in systemic failures (e.g., adequacy and due process
suits for schools and child welfare) if the executive branch problem is not just
one of money but also one of an outdated model?
* What should the courts do if equal protection means maintaining a system of
equally inadequate protection?
Given limited financial resources, it is unlikely that citizens will receive all the
services that they demand; as problems become more complex, citizens will
increasingly look to the judiciary for protection. Government responses to these factors
increasingly involve the use of third party providers, but neither schools of public
administration nor schools of law pay explicit attention to the implications of this shift.
This fundamental transformation in the way in which we provide public services
requires the role of the courts to change to both protect democratic values and defuse
the dissatisfaction that Pound never anticipated.

